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Old Wine in New Bottles : The Kerner Commission's Misgivings about Black
Power
Abstract
The relentless heat seemed to breed violence during the summer of 1967, as the simmering resentment
in the overcrowded ghettos of American cities finally boiled over into the sun-baked streets. Disputes
between local residents and police erupted into scenes of looting and vandalism in Newark and Detroit
and conjured up disquieting memories of the 1965 Watts riots. Rioting had also taken place in Tampa,
Cincinnati, and Atlanta earlier that summer. In July, troubled by a growing sense of urban lawlessness,
President Lyndon Johnston established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, more
commonly called the Kerner Commission after its chairman, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. Johnson
instructed the commission to provide a fair assessment of the tide of racially-motivated violence that was
sweeping American cities. Their findings, published a year later, were prefaced with a sobering warning:
“Our Nation is moving toward two societies,” they wrote, “one black, one white—separate and unequal.”
This assessment came at a time when white Americans were becoming increasingly concerned by the
call for “Black Power,” a slogan often associated with militant groups such as the Black Panthers. The
Kerner Commission’s findings reflect their misgivings about Black Power and their concern that the
doctrine would lead to increased racial tensions in American cities and make the goal of integration
impossible.
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The relentless heat seemed to breed violence during the summer of 1967, as the
simmering resentment in the overcrowded ghettos of American cities finally boiled over
into the sun-baked streets. Disputes between local residents and police erupted into
scenes of looting and vandalism in Newark and Detroit and conjured up disquieting
memories of the 1965 Watts riots. Rioting had also taken place in Tampa, Cincinnati, and
Atlanta earlier that summer. In July, troubled by a growing sense of urban lawlessness,
President Lyndon Johnston established the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, more commonly called the Kerner Commission after its chairman, Illinois
Governor Otto Kerner. Johnson instructed the commission to provide a fair assessment of
the tide of racially-motivated violence that was sweeping American cities. Their findings,
published a year later, were prefaced with a sobering warning: “Our Nation is moving
toward two societies,” they wrote, “one black, one white—separate and unequal.”1 This
assessment came at a time when white Americans were becoming increasingly concerned
by the call for “Black Power,” a slogan often associated with militant groups such as the
Black Panthers. The Kerner Commission’s findings reflect their misgivings about Black
Power and their concern that the doctrine would lead to increased racial tensions in
American cities and make the goal of integration impossible.
Black Power was hard to define, but its appeal to African-Americans was
undeniable. The Kerner Commission likened it to “old wine in new bottles,” and
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suggested that “what is new about Black Power is phraseology rather than substance.” 2
In their report, the commission attributed the popularity of the slogan to the weakening of
the civil rights movement and a growing disenchantment with nonviolence:
Powerless to make any fundamental changes in the life of the
masses…many advocates of Black Power have retreated into an unreal
world, where they see an outnumbered and poverty-stricken minority
organizing itself entirely separately from whites and creating sufficient
power to force white America to grant its demands.3
However, black Americans saw things differently. In his 1967 book Black Power and
Urban Unrest, written in response to the summer’s riots, Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr., defined
Black Power in a more positive light: “The thrust of Black Power is toward freeing the
latent power of Negroes to enrich the life of the whole nation.”4 Stokely Carmichael, who
is credited with coining the term “Black Power” during the 1966 Meredith March, called
on African-Americans to reject the promises of integration and seek power on their own
terms.5 But most white Americans shared the Kerner Commission’s mistrust of Black
Power, interpreting it as a call to arms against the established social order. The escalation
of urban violence at the height of the doctrine’s popularity led many to believe that Black
Power was a threat to the American way of life.
The Kerner Commission noted with concern the role of Black Power in the urban
riots. They cited the “frustrations of powerlessness” among the causes of the incidents,
adding that the “frustrations are reflected in alienation and hostility toward the
institutions of law and government and the white society which controls them, and in the
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reach toward racial consciousness and solidarity reflected in the slogan ‘Black Power.’”6
Interestingly, the report’s only record of the slogan’s use during an urban confrontation is
by a child. In New Brunswick, New Jersey, where violence threatened to spread from
nearby Plainfield and crowds of angry residents gathered in the streets, a black minister
attempted to intercept a group of marching teenagers. Suddenly “a small boy, about 13
years old, looked up at the minister: ‘Black power, baby!’ he said.”7 According to civil
rights worker Tom Hayden, groups of teenagers in Newark chanted “Black Power!” as
they broke shop windows.8 These anecdotes illustrate the extraordinary energy behind
Black Power; unlike Martin Luther King’s teachings of nonviolence, Black Power had
risen beyond a mere civil rights tactic, transferring effectively from Carmichael’s
speeches to the streets of Northern cities. Even children knew the phrase “Black Power.”
The commission’s profile of the average riot participant also suggests the
significance of Black Power in American cities. The commission rejected the media’s
portrayal of rioters as criminals and deviants, depicting the typical participant as a
“Negro, unmarried male between the ages of 15 and 24,” working as an unskilled laborer.
However, the average rioter was usually slightly better-educated than his peers, and
“feels strongly that he deserves a better job and that he is barred from achieving
it…because of discrimination by employers.”9 But most significantly, the commission
found that rioters were more likely to follow current events and were more
knowledgeable about politics than many of their counterparts. The average rioter was
also likely to be involved in civil rights, but was “extremely distrustful of the political
6

Report, 5.
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system and of political leaders.”10 This average rioter, a disenfranchised young man,
suspicious of both the white power structure and traditional black leaders, was the ideal
audience for Stokely Carmichael’s call for Black Power. Black Power made traditional
African-American leaders obsolete and questioned the effectiveness of the existing civil
rights movement, just as the commission’s profiled rioters did.11 In his account of the
riots in Newark, Hayden noted that although most of that city’s rioters were not actively
involved in the civil rights movement, they “liked and understood the slogan ‘black
power.’”12
The commission also discovered that riot participants subscribed to another aspect
of the Black Power ideology: pride in their heritage. Surveys conducted in Detroit and
Newark also revealed strong feelings of racial pride and superiority among rioters. One
respondent said that when he participated in the disturbances he was “feeling proud, man,
at the fact that I was a Negro…I didn’t feel ashamed of my race because of what [rioters]
did.”13 The commission noted that the typical rioter “takes great pride in his race and
believes that in some respects Negroes are superior to whites.”14 This attitude also aligns
with the growth of Black Power, which emphasized black pride and self-reliance. Black
Power also rejected the goal of integration, a goal that must have seemed pointless to
ghetto-dwellers in the supposedly-integrated North.15
The Kerner Commission viewed Black Power as a major part of the problem in
racial violence. But could it also offer a solution? No, the commission concluded. They
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felt that the growth of Black Power would increase racial polarization and create a nation
of “two societies.” As white residents flocked to the suburbs to escape urban blight, inner
cities were becoming predominantly black. This meant that fewer tax dollars were
available to support inner cities as middle-class residents moved away. Urban
infrastructure continued to decay, and political power shifted away from the cities along
with the wealthier middle and upper classes. Although many black leaders felt that
predominantly black cities would lead to increased black leadership, the commission
warned that by 1985, the segregated, inner-city black population would reach 21 million,
a number larger than the 1967 population of every African nation except Nigeria:
If developing a racially integrated society is extraordinarily difficult today
when 12.1 million Negroes live in central cities, then it is quite clearly
going to be virtually impossible in 1985 when almost 21 million
Negroes—still much poorer and less educated than most whites—will be
living there.16
The commission offered three “choices for the future:” to continue with present policies
(which would lead to increased poverty and unrest), to choose a process of enrichment (a
process favored by proponents of Black Power), or to integrate. The Kerner Commission
saw integration as the country’s only hope; however, they offered few practical
suggestions on how to achieve this end.17
The “enrichment choice,” as the commission put it, would depend on social
programs (such as those instituted by Johnson as part of his War on Poverty) to improve
the quality of life in the inner city. This strategy, the report claims, aligned with the Black
Power ideology in that it would allow African-Americans to gain leadership in their
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communities and make decisions that would benefit themselves.18 However, the report
fails to explain how adding more (presumably white-led) social programs to the existing
power structure would enable inner-city blacks to take control of their own futures. The
only certain outcome of the enrichment choice was demographical; by funding social
programs in the inner cities instead of working for integration, whites would continue
their migration to the suburbs while large cities would become overwhelmingly black.
“In short,” the report said, “this argument would regard predominantly Negro central
cities and predominantly white outlying areas not as harmful, but as an advantageous
future.”19 Many blacks agreed. Civil rights workers emphasized the importance of black
leadership in city government and community schools. While “enriching” the ghetto
through federal dollars would help, they believed that power was the answer to ending
inner-city poverty. 20 Stokely Carmichael used this argument to support his Black Power
ideology:
…the society either pretends it doesn’t know of [ghetto conditions], or is
incapable of doing anything meaningful about it. And this resistance to
doing anything meaningful about conditions in that ghetto comes from the
fact that the ghetto is itself a product of a combination of forces and
special interests in the white community, and the groups that have access
to the resources and power to change that situation benefit, politically and
economically, from the existence of that ghetto.
As Carmichael saw it, poor blacks needed to take control of their own communities
because the white power structure could not be counted upon to address inner-city
problems.

18
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Kerner and his fellow commission members admitted that supporters of Black
Power did have a point: “It is not surprising that some Black-Power [sic] advocates are
denouncing integration and claiming that, given the hypocrisy and racism that pervade
white society, life in a black society is, in fact, morally superior.”21 However, the
commission believed that the “enrichment choice” was impractical and, at worst,
dangerous to the country’s future. Increased social programs would cost billions of
dollars, and Johnson’s idealistic War on Poverty was already competing for funds with
the war in Vietnam. Furthermore, the implementation of these ambitious programs could
take years, and the commission regarded American cities as ticking time bombs.22
Finally, the commission believed that integration was the only way to achieve racial
equality. To keep blacks segregated in inner cities, even while funding programs to
improve conditions in these areas, would be to return to a doctrine of “separate but
equal.” If polarization continued, the commission warned, “the Negro society will be
permanently relegated to its current status, possibly even if we expend great amounts of
money and effort in trying to ‘gild’ the ghetto.”23
When Johnson created the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders in the wake of the Detroit riots in July 1967, he told the nation, “There will be
attempts to interpret the events of the past few days. But when violence strikes, then
those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job: not to analyze,
but to end disorder.”24 The Kerner Commission’s effectiveness in ending the disorder that
gripped the nation’s cities is debatable. Its goal of integration has never been fully
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realized, and urban decay and “white flight” to the suburbs are still issues faced by
today’s policy makers. Predominantly black schools still lag behind white schools in test
scores and funding, and black citizens still fear police brutality. However, despite
Johnson’s insistence that analysis was secondary to finding solutions, the Kerner
Commission compiled a reasonable interpretation of the causes of the ghetto riots.
Although many supporters of Black Power insisted that it was not a violent or
militant movement, the urban riots of the mid-1960s led white Americans to fear that a
new race war was beginning on the nation’s city streets. The Kerner Commission shared
this fear, and their 1968 report to President Johnson is evidence of their mistrust of Black
Power. The commission continued its pursuit of the traditional goal of the civil rights
movement—integration. But the movement itself had changed, and African-Americans
no longer felt that integration was the magic solution to the race problem in the United
States. Black Power, once an outgrowth of the movement, had become the movement
itself as the battleground shifted from the fields of the south to the teeming ghettos of the
urban north.

